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PROTECTING SHAREHOLDERS FROM 
THEMSELVES: HOW THE UNITED 
KINGDOM’S 2011 TAKEOVER CODE 
AMENDMENTS HIT THEIR MARK 
Matthew Peetz

 
INTRODUCTION 
American food conglomerate Kraft Foods’ four-month-long, 
hostile-turned-friendly takeover of British icon Cadbury,1 met with 
outcries from unions, politicians, and the general public.2 The uproar 
led to major changes in the United Kingdom’s City Code on 
                                                 
  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State 
University. I would like to thank the JLIA editorial board from the graduating 
classes of 2012, 2013, and 2014 for all of their help in the writing, revising, and 
editing processes. I would like to thank Professor Sam Thompson for the 
inspiration for this piece. I would like to thank Dean Amy Gaudion for making me 
a better a legal writer and editor. And finally, I would like to thank my Grandfather, 
my Mom & Dad, and Colleen Kasprzak for their continued love and support 
throughout law school and particularly through the long nights associated with 
writing for a journal. 
1 See TIMELINE-Kraft Agrees to Cadbury Deal After 4-month Fight, 
REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/cadbury-kraft-
idUSLDE60E0XI20100119 [hereinafter TIMELINE).  
2 See David Jones & Brad Dorfman, Kraft Snares Cadbury for $19.6 Billion, 
REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/19/us-cadbury-
idUSTRE60H1N020100119. Much of the concern among the public was over two 
things: losing Cadbury, a uniquely British company, to a faceless giant of a 
company; and over the potential loss of jobs, which occurs after almost any merger 
when the two newly merged companies start consolidating operations and work 
forces. 
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Takeovers and Mergers (“Takeover Code”).3  Within eighteen 
months of the takeover, The Code Committee (“The Code 
Committee” or “The Committee”) of The Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers (“the Takeover Panel” or “The Panel”) amended the 
Takeover Code. The Committee’s change corrected the perceived 
imbalance of power in favor of bidders in a takeover attempt.4  It is 
unclear, however, whether this inequity was as threatening as the 
public outcry made it seem.5  Rather, The Code Committee may have 
succumbed to political pressures by creating amendments that 
protect target companies at the expense of target company 
shareholders.6  Moreover, some large law firms hypothesized that the 
new Code amendments would deter some potential bidders from 
ever pursuing a target company, thereby chilling the mergers and 
acquisitions (“M&A”) market and reducing potential sale proceeds to 
target shareholders.7  On the other hand, “short-term” investors can 
unduly influence hostile bids.8  Therefore, in practice, the 
                                                 
3 See generally THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY 
CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (10th ed. 2011), 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf 
[hereinafter Takeover Code]. 
4 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, REVIEW OF CERTAIN 
ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, 2010, Consultation Paper 
Issued by The Code Committee of The Panel PCP 2010/2, 4, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2008/11/PCP201002.p
df [hereinafter Consultation Paper]. 
5 See generally Michael R. Patrone, Sour Chocolate? Cadbury/Kraft and the 
2011 Proposed Amendments to the U.K. Takeover Code – A Call for Further Research, 8 
BYU INT’L L. MGMT. R. 63, 66 (2011),  
http://www.law2.byu.edu/ilmr/articles/winter_2011/BYU_ILMR_winter_2011_4
_Chocolate.pdf. See also note 99.  
6 See Patrone, supra note 5, at 65-66; Takeover Code, Introduction, ¶ 2(a) at 
A1 (stating that the shareholders are the primary constituents whom The Code 
seeks to protect). 
7 See, e.g., Corporate Legal Alert, Mayer Brown, Takeover Code Changes 
Published – Is This a New Era for UK Takeovers? (July 2011) 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/Takeover-Code-changes-published—-
is-this-a-new-era-for-UK-takeovers-07-21-2011/; Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, 
Impact of UK Takeover Code Reform, 10 (Sept. 15, 2011) 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2011/09/impact_
of_uk_takeovercodereform.html.   
8 See infra Part III.A. See also Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 4 
(describing “short-term” investors as those shareholders who become interested in 
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shareholders of the target company may not be protected to the 
extent The Code originally envisioned.  This “short-term” investor 
problem was the primary problem the amendments intended to fix.9  
Either way the amendments will likely substantially impact how a 
takeover bid will operate in the United Kingdom going forward. 
This comment argues that The Code amendments will 
protect target company shareholders beyond the pre-amendment 
regime, without over-regulating and potentially harming other aspects 
of takeover practice.  Had The Code Committee gone further by fully 
implementing10 the proposed idea of exempting “short-term” 
investors from voting on transactions,11 the M&A market generally, 
and target shareholders specifically, would have been harmed in 
contravention of the principles12 of the Takeover Code.  Although 
the Takeover Panel appeared to react due to the public dismay, the 
amendments will serve the established shareholders of publically 
traded United Kingdom companies, and therefore strengthen the 
protections envisioned under the original spirit of The Code.13 
Part I of this comment will briefly explore the history of the 
Kraft-Cadbury takeover and the resulting fervor surrounding the 
deal.14  Part II will discuss the traditional functions of the Takeover 
Panel and the Takeover Code.15  Part III will explain the four major 
                                                 
the shares of the target company only after a public announcement of a possible 
offer); see also Jean Eaglesham & Lina Saigol, Mandelson Urges Radical Takeover Reform, 
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5491ca8a-2587-11df-
9bd3-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1Y8uy6kxO.  
9 See Steven M. Davidoff, British Takeover Rules May Mean Quicker Pace but 
Fewer Bids, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 19, 2011, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/new-british-rules-will-speed-up-the-
pace-of-takeovers/.   
10 This comment will suggest, infra Part IV, that a measured, limited 
application of this proposed amendment may increase shareholder protection in 
the future. 
11 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 20. 
12 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, Gen. Principles 1-6, at B1; 
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Explanatory Paper: Implementation of the 
European Directive on Takeover Bids, 2005/10, apps. 1-2 at 24-26. 
13 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, Gen. Principles 1-6, at B1. 
14 See infra Part I.A.  
15 See infra Part I.B.  
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changes to the Takeover Code and will explore the concerns with, 
and the reasoning behind, each amendment by examining the 
consulting and explanatory papers about The Code amendments 
issued by the Takeover Panel.16  Part IV will first look to economic 
studies of shareholder value in takeovers17 and then explore the 
effects of “short-term” investors18 on takeover attempts.19  Finally, 
this comment will conclude that the new amendments will mitigate 
those “short-term” investor detrimental effects and actually protect 
shareholders as the Takeover Code had always intended. 
I. HISTORY & BACKGROUND 
 A.  The Kraft-Cadbury Deal, the Resulting Fervor, and Swift  
  Action by the Takeover Panel 
It took Kraft Foods four hard-fought months to reach a deal 
with the shareholders of Cadbury.20  After a series of offers and 
rejections, and then over two months of Cadbury posting increasing 
financial projections and share prices, Kraft increased its bid to £11.9 
billion ($19.55 billion U.S.), which the Cadbury board accepted on 
January 19, 2010.21  The Cadbury shareholders accepted Kraft’s 
tender offer22 on February 2, 2010, with over seventy percent of the 
                                                 
16 See infra Parts II.A-D.   
17 See infra Part III.A.  
18 Merger arbitrageurs, discussed infra Part III.B, are the most prevalent 
type of “short-term” investors in M&A practices and the type with which this 
comment will concern itself. 
19 See infra Part III.B.  
20 See TIMELINE, supra note 1.  
21 See Graeme Wearden, Timeline: Cadbury’s Fight Against Kraft, THE 
GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2010,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/19/cadbury-kraft-takeover-
timeline.  Kraft made a public indicative offer on September 7, 2009, for £10.2 
billion (approximately $16.3 billion U.S.), Kraft submitted its firm hostile bid 
directly to the Cadbury shareholders on November 9, 2009, on the same terms it 
originally proposed to the Cadbury board.  This offer was quickly rejected by the 
shareholders.  See id. 
22 For an explanation of a tender offer see Tender Offer, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’, http://www.sec.gov/answers/tender.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (“A 
tender offer is a broad solicitation by a company or a third party to purchase a 
substantial percentage of a company’s . . . registered equity shares or units for a 
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shareholders tendering their shares.23  During this four-month 
process, the composition of the Cadbury shareholders changed 
drastically.24  By the time the shareholders tendered their shares, 
“short-term” investors such as hedge funds had increased their share 
in Cadbury from five percent to about thirty-one percent of the 
company.25 
Throughout the takeover battle unions and politicians in the 
United Kingdom voiced strong opposition to Kraft swallowing 
Cadbury.26  United Kingdom Business Secretary Lord Peter 
Mandelson, for example, was against the takeover as early as 
September 25, 2009.27  After the transaction was consummated, 
Mandelson urged substantial reform of the United Kingdom takeover 
regime.28  Unions in the United Kingdom also argued against the 
Cadbury takeover due to the fear of large-scale job cuts.29  
Compounding the fears and flaring political tempers, the Royal Bank 
of Scotland, at the time an eighty-four percent taxpayer-owned bank, 
agreed to loan Kraft £630 million (approximately $1.03 billion U.S.) 
to finance the takeover after the bank had been bailed out by the 
                                                 
limited period of time. The offer is at a fixed price, usually at a premium over the 
current market price, and is customarily contingent on shareholders tendering a 
fixed number of their shares or units”). 
23 David Jones & Brad Dorfman, Cadbury Shareholders Approve Kraft 
Takeover, REUTERS, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/02/us-
cadbury-kraft-idUSTRE61124D20100202.   
24 See Foreign Takeovers in Britain: Small Island for Sale, ECONOMIST, May 25, 
2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15769586.  
25 Id.  
26 See infra text accompanying notes 27-30.  
27 David Teather, Mandelson Admits Foreign Ownership of Firms Disadvantages 
UK, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2009, 
 http://www.guardian.com.uk/business/2009/sep/25/mandelson-british-industry-
unions.   
28 See Eaglesham & Saigol, supra note 8.  
29 See Debt-Heavy Kraft Could Put 30,000 Cadbury Jobs at Risk, Warns Unite, 
UNITE THE UNION, Jan. 13, 2010, 
http://archive.unitetheunion.org/news__events/archived_news_releases/2010_arc
hived_press_releases/debt-heavy_kraft_could_put_3-1.aspx .  
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
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government.30  Surely the Takeover Panel was acutely aware of the 
mounting political pressure throughout the United Kingdom. 
In contrast to the dragged out takeover battle that ensued 
between Kraft and Cadbury, it took less than a year and a half for 
The Code Committee of the Takeover Panel to consider, propose, 
and adopt amendments to the United Kingdom’s Takeover Code.31  
In fact, a mere five weeks after the Kraft and Cadbury deal was 
completed, The Code Committee announced its intention to solicit 
input from the United Kingdom business community to review 
specific aspects of the Takeover Code.32  The Committee cited the 
Kraft takeover of Cadbury and the public reaction to the deal as the 
impetus for its action.33 After this consultation period expired,34 The 
Code Committee reviewed responses from numerous respondents. 
The Committee then roughly outlined amendments it felt compelled 
to undertake in an October 21, 2010, report.35  By March 2011, The 
Committee had proposed amendments to the Takeover Code,36 
which it adopted with little change in late July 2011.37  These 
amendments took effect September 19, 2011.38 
                                                 
30 Clegg Attacks Brown Over RBS Funding for Cadbury Bid, BBC, Jan. 20, 
2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8470776.stm. 
  
31 The Code Committee officially announced and adopted the 
amendments in July 2011, but it was another two months before the amendments 
came into effect on Sept. 19, 2011. 
32 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 1.  
33 Id. 
34 The consultation period ran from June 1, 2010 to July 27, 2010. 
35 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE COMMITTEE, 
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, PCP 
2010/2, 1–2, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/2010-22.pdf [hereinafter Panel Report]. 
36 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE COMMITTEE, 
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS: 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER CODE, PCP 2011/1, 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/PCP201101.pdf [hereinafter Proposed Amendments].  
37 See THE CODE COMMITTEE OF THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND 
MERGERS, 2011, AMENDMENTS FOLLOWING THE CODE COMMITTEE’S REVIEW OF 
THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS, Instrument 2011/2, 1, 
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 B.  The Operation of the Takeover Code and the Takeover Panel 
The Takeover Panel was originally created in 1968 to oversee 
takeover regulation in the United Kingdom.39  The Takeover Panel is 
charged with issuing and administering the Takeover Code.40  The 
United Kingdom Companies Act of 2006 codified and broadened the 
rule-making powers of the Takeover Panel.41  Interestingly, when The 
Code Committee first started soliciting input for the recent 
amendments to The Code, the introduction paragraph of the 
Takeover Code stated that its purpose was to ensure the fair 
treatment of shareholders generally.42 However, when The Code 
Committee published its Consultation Paper that began the initial 
solicitations of input, the introduction had changed. The Committee 
specifically wrote that The Code is designed principally to ensure that 
shareholders in an offeree43 company . . . are treated fairly.”44  As 
such, the Consultation Paper may have been the first indication that 
political pressures were forcing The Panel to consider strengthening 
target company shareholder protection.45 
The Takeover Panel and the Takeover Code are not 
concerned with the financial and commercial merits of takeovers.46  
                                                 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/Instrument-
2011-2.pdf [hereinafter Amendment Instrument]. 
38 Id.  
39 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 1-2.  The Takeover Panel governs 
publically listed companies on the U.K. stock exchanges that have their registered 
offices in the U.K.  See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 3(a) at A3. 
40 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 1 at A1. 
41 Companies Act 2006, (c. 46), pt. 28 ch. 1. 
42 See Amendment Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 1. (amending Introduction 
¶ 2(a) from “The Code is designed principally to ensure that shareholders are 
treated fairly . . .” to “. . . to ensure that shareholders in an offeree company are treated 
fairly . . .”). 
43 The Takeover Panel uses the terms “Offeree” and “Offeror” to 
designate targets and acquirers.  This comment will typically use the American 
designations of “target” and “acquirer” or “bidder,” but will also use the formal 
British terms of The Panel at times, especially when quoting or directly referring to 
the Takeover Code or papers from The Panel. 
44 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 2.  
45 See generally Davidoff, supra note 9. 
46 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction ¶ 2(a) at A1; Consultation Paper at 
2, 5.  
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:2 
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The Panel has never taken a view on the advantages or disadvantages 
of takeovers to the companies participating in them.47  Instead, The 
Panel and The Code exist to establish a framework to regulate the 
conduct of companies involved in a particular transaction.48 The final 
decision on the merits of an offer, however, is left to the 
shareholders.49 
In light of these principles, a central pillar of the Takeover 
Code, and an excellent example of its purpose of ensuring fair 
treatment of shareholders, is the Board Neutrality Rule.50  The Board 
Neutrality Rule prevents the board of directors of a target company 
from taking any action that may frustrate or deny the shareholders 
the opportunity to decide on the merits of an offer themselves.51  
This is in stark contrast to the defensive tactics, such as poison pills,52 
that Delaware courts have long endorsed.53  As seen in the Cadbury 
takeover, the best defense a target board can legally employ is to ask 
the shareholders to vote against the bid.54 Cadbury’s board, for 
example, could only show improved financial data in an attempt to 
convince its shareholders that their long-term prospects of remaining 
shareholders of Cadbury were better than their short-term prospects 
(i.e. selling their shares to “short-term” investors or Kraft).55  
Alternatively, Cadbury’s board could attempt to increase the fair 
                                                 
47 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 5. 
48 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction ¶ 2(a) at A1. 
49 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction ¶ 2(a) at A1-A2.  
50 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.1(a) at I13 (applying during the 
course of an offer or when an offer is reasonably believed to be imminent). 
51 Id.  
52 SAMUEL S. THOMPSON, JR., BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS: CORPORATE, SECURITIES, TAX, ANTITRUST, INTERNATIONAL, AND 
RELATED ASPECTS 155-56 (3d ed. 2008) (“The basic objectives of the [poison pill] 
are to deter abusive takeover tactics by making them unacceptably expensive to the 
raider [i.e. a hostile bidder] and to encourage prospective acquirers to negotiate 
with the board of directors of the target rather than to attempt a hostile takeover.”). 
53 See e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 
1985). 
54 See Wearden, supra note 21.  
55 See Id.  
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value of Cadbury’s shares—by making the company more 
profitable—beyond what Kraft would be willing to pay.56 
The Takeover Code presumes it is protecting shareholders 
from board entrenchment57 by requiring neutrality of the board of 
directors of target companies.58  Nevertheless, after receiving 
numerous responses to its Consultation Paper, The Code Committee 
concluded that hostile bidders had gained a tactical advantage over 
targets because of “short-term” investors.59  The irony of dissuading 
board defensive maneuvers, only to have “short-term” investors 
provide the shareholder support that a bidder may need to complete 
their hostile takeover, seems to have been a tipping point for The 
Panel.  In response, The Panel enacted several major amendments, 
discussed below, to help tilt the balance of power back to a more 
reasonable level for the target company shareholders.60 
II.  THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER CODE 
To restore the level of protection originally afforded to target 
company shareholders, The Code Committee sought to correct some 
perceived disadvantages to those shareholders that had developed in 
the system.61  The first problem that The Committee addressed was 
the problem of the “virtual bid.”62  The “virtual bid” is a term of art 
given to the time period after an announcement of a potential bid has 
been made, but before a firm offer is made.63  This time period has 
many effects.  Significantly, it can lead to a change in the composition 
of the shareholders when some shareholders sell to merger 
arbitrageurs64 (i.e. “short-term” investors).65  Other problems The 
                                                 
56 See Id.  
57 For an explanation of board entrenchment see infra Part III.A. 
58 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Note 5 on Rule 21.1 at I15.  
59 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 3; see also supra note 8. 
60 See infra Part I.  
61 See generally Consultation Paper, supra note 4.  
62 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 4.  
63 See id. (explaining that the offer period is the period after there is public 
knowledge of the potential bid.  This can arise from an official announcement or if 
information is accidently leaked). 
64 Id.  
65 See supra text accompanying notes 8, 24-25. 
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Code Committee identified include: the acquiring company 
effectively having the ability to negotiate directly with the target 
shareholders and bypass the board without ever having to make a 
firm offer;66 the bidding company obtaining the protections of the 
Board Neutrality Rule against the target board simply by announcing 
their intent to make an offer;67 a target’s board of directors being 
reluctant to ask The Panel for a “Put Up or Shut Up”68 deadline for 
the fear of appearing self-serving;69 and, the inclusion of inducement 
fees (i.e. break fees70) becoming standard practice in many recent 
deals possibly precluding competing offers.71  The Code Committee 
attempts to address all of these problems through the amendments, 
which will account for the following four major changes to the 
operation of the United Kingdom’s Takeover Code. 
 A.  The Announcing All Bidders Requirement 
The 2011 Amendments to the Takeover Code will affect how 
bidding companies approach target companies.72 The new 
Announcing All Bidders requirement, operating in concert with the 
mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline,73 will likely have the 
greatest impact on the approach.  Rule 2.4(a) of the Takeover Code 
has been completely rewritten to require a target company to identify 
any potential bidder with which the target has been in negotiations74 
as soon as an offer period commences.75  Furthermore, Rule 2.2 now 
                                                 
66 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 4. 
67 Id.  
68 See generally Put Up or Shut Up, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, (Feb. 02, 2012, 
3:09 PM) http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=put-up-or-shut-up (“The ‘put up or 
shut up’ Takeover Panel rule is designed to stop predators besieging companies for 
an indefinite period of time. It requires a potential bidder either to make an offer to 
shareholders or walk away for a period of six months”).  
69 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 4-5.  
70 See Break Fee infra note 111.  
71 Panel Report, supra note 35, at 5. 
72 See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 16.  
73 Infra Part II.B. 
74 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.4(a) at D5; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 8. 
75 See Amendment Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 8; see also id. at app. 3 
(“An offer period will commence when the first announcement is made of an offer 
or possible offer for a company”). 
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requires that the target company make an announcement in any of 
three situations: first, when the board of the target company receives 
notification of a firm intention to make an offer;76 second, when 
following an approach from, or on behalf of, a bidding company the 
target company becomes the subject of rumors, speculation or if 
there is an untoward movement in the target company’s share price;77 
or third, when a potential bidder has considered an offer but has not 
approached the board of the target company yet, and the target 
becomes the subject of rumor or speculation, or there is an untoward 
movement in the target company’s share price and there are 
reasonable grounds to conclude that the bidder’s potential actions 
have led to the situation.78  In other words, when it is known or 
rumored that a potential bid may affect securities’ prices, the target 
company is required to make a public announcement of all known 
potential bidders.  This amendment will likely heighten the secrecy 
with which bidding companies will plan their approach because the 
mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline amendments, discussed 
below, will tie in with this mandatory identification of the All 
Potential Bidders Amendment.79 
 B.  The Mandatory Twenty-Eight Day “Put Up or Shut Up”  
      Deadline 
Amended rules to the Takeover Code 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 
together govern the function of the colloquially dubbed “Put Up or 
Shut Up” deadline.80  Rule 2.6(a) expressly grants only a limited 
twenty-eight day window from when a potential bidder is first 
                                                 
76 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 at D2-D5; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 5-6.   
77 Takeover Code, supra note3, Rule 2.2 at D2-D5; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 5-6.  
78 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 at D2-D5; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 5-6.  
79 See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 16; Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe, Private Equity Global Insights, Proposed Changes to the UK 
Takeover Code (April, 2011) http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-
Publications/Documents/3569.htm.   
80 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.6 at D9-D10; Amendment 
Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 12-14; Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8 at D12-
D14; Amendment Instrument, supra note 37, at app. 16-18. 
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publically identified and announced until that potential acquirer must: 
1) announce a firm intention to make an offer in accordance with 
Rule 2.7;81 or 2) announce that it does not intend to make an offer. 
The latter situation then triggers Rule 2.8.82  Rule 2.8 bars, for six 
months, any company that has announced that it will not make an 
offer to a target from a number of activities, including: announcing 
an offer or possible offer for the same target;83 acquiring any interest 
in shares of the previous target or any irrevocable commitment for 
those shares amounting to an aggregate of thirty-percent of the 
voting rights of the target company;84 making any statement that may 
raise or confirm the possibility that the bidder may make an offer to 
the target company;85 or take any steps in connection with a possible 
offer for the target.86  In other words, Rule 2.6 starts the twenty-eight 
day countdown, at which point the potential bidder must comply 
with Rule 2.7 and make a firm offer (the “Put Up” part), or walk 
away for six months under Rule 2.8 (the “Shut Up” part).87 
Rule 2.6 and its automatic invocation of Rule 2.8 will put time 
constraints on bidders that were rarely seen before the amendments.88  
This change reflects The Panel’s attempt to remedy the 
aforementioned problems resulting from the “virtual bid.”89  Now 
that the twenty-eight day deadline begins automatically upon an 
                                                 
81 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.7(a) at D11-D12 (requiring an 
offeror company to follow through on its firm intention to make an offer unless 
another company makes a higher offer or some other limited exceptions occur). 
82 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.6(a) at D9. 
83 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(a) at D12-13. 
84 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(b)-(c) at D12-D13. 
85 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(d) at D12-D13.  
86 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.8(e) at D12-D13. 
87 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rules 2.6-2.8 at D9-D13.  
88 See Put Up or Shut Up, supra note 68 (explaining that before the 
amendments a 28 day Put Up or Shut Up deadline was imposed by The Panel only 
after the target board asked for, and was granted one by The Panel, when they were 
besieged without a firm offer having been made). 
89 THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE COMMITTEE, 
REVIEW OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE REGULATION OF TAKEOVER BIDS: 
RESPONSE STATEMENT BY THE CODE COMMITTEE OF THE PANEL FOLLOWING 
THE CONSULTATION ON PCP 2011/1, RS 2011/1 at 7, 12 
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/RS201101.pdf [hereinafter Response Statement]. 
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announcement that starts an offer period, bidding companies will 
want to keep their investigations into, or preparations for, an offer 
secret for as long as possible.90  Bidding companies will likely shroud 
their actions in secrecy to avoid having only twenty-eight days to 
“Put Up or Shut Up” when they are not advanced enough in their 
preparations to make an offer within that period.91 
About two-thirds of respondents to the Consultation Paper 
were actually opposed to the coupling of the all bidders identification 
requirement and the mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline for 
various reasons.92  The primary reason is because the mandatory “Put 
Up or Shut Up” deadline may reduce competition for the acquisition 
of target companies and thus possibly deny target shareholders the 
benefit of other competing offers.93  Also, it may cause more 
advanced potential bidders to “flush out” less advanced potential 
bidders by leaking information that will require an announcement 
and an identification of all potential bidders.94  The amendments may 
otherwise create an “uneven playing field” where bidders that are 
more advanced in their preparations will have a large advantage over 
those not as advanced in their preparations.95  The Panel decided to 
enact the amendments with little change despite having more 
opposition than support.96 
                                                 
90 This is now due to the requirement that all bidders be named in an 
announcement that opens an offer period from amended Rules 2.2 and 2.4(a). 
91 See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 11, 16; Orrick, 
Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.  
92 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 8.  
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 Id. (showing that although listed as separate concerns, those 
respondents who were opposed to the mandatory identification of all potential 
bidders requirement were generally concerned about the “uneven playing field” that 
could arise after an announcement that starts an offer period regardless of whether 
it begins in the natural course of offer negotiations or because a well-advanced 
bidding company is attempting to “flush out” the less well-advanced potential 
bidders). 
96 See id. at 9-11. Furthermore The Committee deemed that it would be 
inappropriate to allow the Offeree company’s board to decide when they wanted to 
keep a potential bidder’s identity secret because that would lead to potential bidders 
requiring, as a pre-condition, a confidentiality agreement to keep their identity 
concealed in almost every deal.  Id.  
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The Panel decided that it would review how the amendments 
affected the M&A market one year after their implementation.97  The 
one-year review was published in November of 2012.98 Although the 
findings were generally positive, the report also stated that much of 
the effects of the amendments remain to be seen.99  Multiple large 
law firms predicted, just after The Panel announced that the 
amendments would be adopted, that the identification of all potential 
bidders requirement, and the mandatory twenty-eight day “Put Up or 
Shut Up” deadline, would require bidders to use the utmost secrecy 
when preparing a bid.100  Bidders would need to be much more 
advanced in their preparations before making an approach to a target 
company board of directors than a bidding company would be under 
the pre-amendments Code.101  The Committee kept the narrow 
exception that a target board could request an extension of the “Put 
Up or Shut Up” deadline for some or all potential bidders in a 
takeover.102  This exception will provide some relief for potential 
bidders negotiating a friendly acquisition with the target company’s 
board of directors.103  Hostile bidders, on the other hand, will need to 
be wary of how they protect information regarding a potential 
approach to a target.104  It is this heightened wariness that led some 
commentators to conclude that the amendments will deter potential 
bidders from ever making an offer in the first place and thereby harm 
                                                 
97 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 5.  
98 Discussed infra Part III.  
99 See generally THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS CODE 
COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF THE 2011 AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER CODE, 
2012/8,  
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2012-8.pdf 
[hereinafter One Year Review].  
100 Iain Wright, Publications, The UK Takeover Code: Significant Changes 
Come Into Effect, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS (Sept. 22, 2011), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publication.detail/publicati
onID/1f22a35e-c340-4de3-9703-2954b8020a98. See Client Briefing, Clifford 
Chance, supra note 7, at 16; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79. 
101 See Wright, supra note 100; Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 
7, at 11, 16; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79.  
102 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 2.6(c) at D9. 
103 Wright, supra note 100, at 3. 
104 See Wright, supra note 100, at 2. 
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target shareholders by suppressing bid competition.105  The divisive 
response of commentators, both before and after The Panel adopted 
the amendments, shows that these two major amendments aimed at 
correcting the “virtual bid” period remain the most controversial of 
the amendments.106 
 C.  The Prohibition of Deal Protection Measures 
The Panel’s sweeping decision to prohibit deal protection 
measures, except in limited circumstances,107 puts the United 
Kingdom at odds with most other developed M&A markets.108  As 
part of the amendments, The Code Committee entirely rewrote Rule 
21.2.109  New Rule 21.2(a) prohibits the target company, or any 
person acting in concert with the target company, from entering into 
any offer related arrangements with a bidder.110  Furthermore, Rule 
21.2(b) makes it clear that this prohibition includes inducement 
fees111 of any amount.112  This is a significant change to U.K. M&A 
practice where inducement fees of one-percent had become standard 
                                                 
105 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 8; Patrone, supra note 5, at 77-
78.  
106 See Wright, supra note 100, at 2. 
107 The exceptions where the amendments still allow inducement fees are: 
with a friendly or more preferred competing bid to a hostile bid (a “white knight”) 
up to one-percent of the first “white knight” offer only payable if the hostile 
competing bid is successful; if the target is in financial distress; or with a preferred 
bidder up to one-percent of the bid in the event that the target has commenced a 
formal auction sale. See Client Briefing, Clifford Chance, supra note 7, at 8, 12 
(stating that most markets allow deal protection measures).  
108 Id. (stating that most markets allow deal protection measures). 
109 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 37.  
110 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.2(a) at I16; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 32. 
111 See generally Megan Murphy, Takeover Panel Set to Ban Break Fees, FIN. 
TIMEs, Mar. 21, 2011, at 18; Break Fee, THE FREE DICTIONARY 
http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Break+Fee (“In mergers and 
acquisitions, a fee the target pays to the acquirer in case a deal fails before 
completion. Theoretically, this is done to reimburse the acquirer for due diligence 
expenses, but, in practice, it is often used to attempt to restore good relations 
between the two companies”). 
112 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.2(b) at I16; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at app. 32. 
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in almost all acquisitions.113 By comparison, the Delaware Chancery 
Courts have allowed inducement fees of three or three-and-a-half 
percent.114  Although commentators agree that this sweeping ban will 
alter what had become common practice, this modification was not 
contested as much as the “virtual bid” correction amendments.115 
The Panel’s Response Statement to their Consultation Paper 
notes that only around one-third of respondents were opposed to the 
amendments’ prohibition of inducement fees.116  Concerned 
respondents suggested that prohibiting inducement fees would deter 
potential bidders from making offers117 because the cost of preparing 
and negotiating an offer may be prohibitive without some assurance 
that the target will not leave a bidder at the altar.118  Similar to the 
major concern with the “virtual bid” corrective amendments, the 
major concern with the ban on inducement fees is that shareholders 
may be harmed by not having the chance to decide on the merits of 
all potential offers.119  In other words, some commentators are 
concerned that the inducement fee ban will deter potential bidders, 
reduce bid competition, and implicitly devalue the best offers that 
could have been made to a target company.120 
The Code Committee, however, concluded that this argument 
cuts both ways, and that inducement fees possibly deter competing 
bidders from making a topping offer.121  Competing bidders would be 
deterred because they would have to offer at an extra high premium 
                                                 
113 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79. 
114 See e.g., McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (3.5% break fee are not unreasonable); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 
691 (Del. Ch. 2001) (3% break fee and matching rights are not unreasonable). 
115 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 38 (“Around two-thirds of the 
respondents who commented on the proposed general prohibition of offer-related 
arrangements supported it or took a neutral stance”). 
116 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 38. 
117 Id.  
118 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79 (stating that costs 
incurred in pre-offer activities such as due diligence and financing fees could be too 
much of a burden for some potential offerors if there is no compensation for those 
wasted costs if their bid is trumped). 
119 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 38 (emphasis added). 
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 39. 
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to make the deal worthwhile for the target company’s shareholders to 
pay the inducement fee and accept the competing bid.122  With the 
support of a majority of respondents, The Code Committee 
implemented the amendment banning inducement fees because The 
Panel believed that inducement fees had become so standard in 
M&A transactions in the United Kingdom that targets were typically 
not afforded a chance to negotiate over these fees.123  Consequently, 
law firms predict that the inducement fee ban will have the biggest 
impact on private equity firms, because private equity firms will 
typically be in a more constrained financial position and will not want 
to risk losing the money put into preparing a bid if their offer is 
trumped by a competing offer.124  Strategic bidders125 will also be 
concerned about the up-front costs of an offer after these 
amendments, but the effects of the ban on inducement fees will likely 
not be as drastic as with private equity firms.126 
 D.  The Enhanced Disclosure Requirements 
The final major change to the Takeover Code, the imposition 
of enhanced disclosure requirements, consists of a series of small 
changes aimed at increasing transparency during an acquisition.127  
The most important new disclosures required by the Takeover Code 
amendments are the revelation of advisor’s fees,128 bid financing129 
and company financial information,130 and of the bidding company’s 
intention with regard to the target company and the target company 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 See Wright, supra note 100, at 4. 
124 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79. 
125 A Strategic Bidder is a company that is attempting to takeover another 
company for the strategic purpose of enhancing its own value.  For example, Kraft 
taking over Cadbury to improve its market share in the confections market.   
126 See Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, supra note 79. 
127 See generally Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rules 23.2, 23.3, & 24 at J1-J16.  
128 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.16 at J15-J16; Amendment 
Instrument, supra note 37, at 45-46.  
129 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.3(f) at J7; Amendment Instrument, 
supra note 37, at 41.  
130 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.3(a), (c) at J4, J5; Amendment 
Instrument, supra note 37, at 37-39. 
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employees.131  This section will briefly look at each of these major 
disclosure requirements. 
1. Disclosure of Advisor’s Fees 
The idea behind disclosing advisory fees is that although the 
fees may only make up a small percentage of the total transaction, an 
advisory fee is still usually a significant amount of money, sometimes 
rising as high as nine digits.132  With advisory fees being such a 
significant amount of money, The Panel concluded that these fee 
arrangements are material contracts to an offer.133  As such, the 
shareholders deserve to know how the directors are spending 
company money in relation to that offer, and disclosure of those fees 
might reveal incentives for advisors attempting to persuade their 
clients to a particular course of action.134 
2. Disclosure of Financial Information and Financing Information 
Before the amendments were implemented, disclosure of 
financial information and information relating to the financing of an 
offer was only required in securities exchange offers.135  The 
amendments now require disclosure of this information in all offers, 
including cash-out mergers.136  A vast majority of respondents 
supported this disclosure requirement, even though there would be 
some small additional cost to bidders and targets in assembling this 
information for dissemination, because it benefits shareholders far 
beyond that added cost.137 
                                                 
131 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.2 at J3; Amendment Instrument, supra 
note 37, at 37.  
132 Liam Vaughan, M&A: Costs Overlooked in the Heat of the Moment, FIN. 
NEWS, Jan. 3, 2011, http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-01-03/m-and-a-
costs (explaining that investment banks can earn about one to one and one half 
percent on deals over $1 Billion, commercial banks can earn considerably more for 
financing an M&A deal, and legal fees can be as high as $10 Million). 
133 Proposed Amendments, supra note 37, at 58. 
134 Id. 
135 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 67.  
136 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.3(a)-(e) at J4-J7; Amendment 
Instrument, supra note 37, at 37-40. 
137 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 68.  
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 3.  Disclosure of Future Intentions 
  
The major new disclosure requirement that appears to be the 
most reactionary to the Kraft-Cadbury takeover is the requirement to 
disclose intentions138 regarding the target company and its 
employees.139  Many British citizens were upset that Kraft announced 
that it would close Cadbury’s Bristol factory, signaling the loss of 400 
jobs, shortly after it promised to keep it open and spare all Cadbury 
jobs in the United Kingdom.140  The amended Rule 24.2 requires that 
successful bidding companies make known, among other things, their 
intentions with regards to future employment of personnel and 
management, and their strategic plans for the acquired company.141  
If the successful bidder has no intention to make any changes, the 
companies must disclose that as well.142  The respondents to the 
Consultation Paper agreed wholeheartedly with this change.143  The 
Code Committee conceded, though, that some hostile bidders might 
not have undertaken enough due diligence to really know the exact 
future plans of the company.144  In such cases, The Committee still 
expects that the bidding company should disclose, to the full extent 
possible, its business rationale for acquiring the target.145 
The 2011 amendments to the United Kingdom’s City Code 
on Mergers and Takeovers will certainly have an impact on the M&A 
market and on M&A practice.146  The question now becomes 
whether these amendments effectively protect target company 
                                                 
138 For example, The Code Committee now wants an acquiring company 
to state if after the merger or takeover it will make any job cuts or close any offices 
or factories. See Sarah Gadd, The Revised UK Takeover Code: Employment Considerations, 
13 THE WORKING WORLD (Lantham & Watkins), Nov. 2011, 
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/working-world-november-2011. 
139 See id. 
140 See e.g., Cadbury’s Bristol Plant to Close by 2011, BBC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8507066.stm.  
141 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.2 at J3; Amendment Instrument, supra 
note 37, at 36-37.   
142 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 24.2 at J3; Amendment Instrument, supra 
note 37, at 36-37.  (Id.) 
143 Response Statement, supra note 89, at 80. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. 
146 See Davidoff, supra note 9.  
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shareholders from the recent perceived tactical advantage achieved by 
bidding companies?  And furthermore, do the amendments reach too 
far or might they not reach far enough? 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2011 TAKEOVER AMENDMENTS 
As the collective owners of a corporation shareholders stand 
to gain or lose on their investment as the result of a merger or 
acquisition.147  In public corporations, a large majority of 
shareholders individually have only a miniscule vote and cannot 
affect the policies of the corporation by voting their shares without 
the cooperation of many other shareholders.148 In Delaware a 
corporate board of directors is able to utilize a poison pill to block 
their shareholders from selling their shares in a tender offer.149  The 
United Kingdom, however, has developed a vastly different approach 
than the Delaware courts to protect shareholder interests in these 
potential multi-billion pound (or dollar) transactions.150  The United 
Kingdom takeover regulations have always upheld board neutrality in 
a takeover situation, and The Code Committee did not compromise 
that tenet with the 2011 amendments.151 However, some have argued 
that abandoning the Board Neutrality Rule for more Delaware-like 
defensive maneuvers would have better protected shareholders.152  
                                                 
147 See generally 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 630 (2011). 
148 For example, as of the end of September 2011, ExxonMobil’s largest 
shareholder was an institutional investor, The Vanguard Group, Inc. with 4.16% of 
the vote, contrasting with their largest direct shareholder Rex Tillerson, who has 
about 0.03% of the total vote.  Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM): Major Holders, 
YAHOO! FIN. (Jan. 5, 2011 3:55 PM) 
 http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=xom+Major+Holders.  
149 A poison pill, or shareholder’s rights plan, makes the shares so 
unattractive to the potential acquirer that an offer will never actually be made to 
shareholders, even if they desire the offer, without the board of directors first 
redeeming the poison pill.  See e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 
1348-49 (Del. 1985). 
150 See e.g., Han-Wei Liu, The Non-Frustration Rule of The U.K. City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers and Related Agency Problems: What are the Implications for the E.C. 
Takeover Directive?, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 5, 8-9 (2011), 
http://www.cjel.net/online/17_2-liu/ (illustrating briefly the difference in possible 
board of director action under U.S. and U.K. takeover regulation regimes). 
151 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 21.1(a) at I13. 
152 See Patrone, supra note 5, at 85.  
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This dichotomy between United Kingdom and United States 
takeover regulation begs the question: do these takeover regulation 
regimes protect shareholders equally and adequately?  This part will 
look at economic studies of defensive devices and how they affect 
shareholder value, and will also explore how “short-term” investors 
affect established long-term shareholders. 
 A.  Economic Studies of the Impact of Defensive Maneuvers 
Studying the economic effect of defensive maneuvers on 
shareholders in takeover situations requires using data with numerous 
variables.153 Different studies, focusing on different variables, have 
thus led to opposing conclusions.154  The reality of the depth and 
breadth of data and variables results in no one study that definitively 
declares that shareholders benefit or suffer a loss when defensive 
measures are utilized by a target company’s board of directors.155 Yet 
prominent Harvard M&A economist Lucian Bebchuk and some of 
his understudies have exposed a trend that the entrenchment of a 
board of directors156 negatively affects shareholder value.157  This is 
particularly relevant to the 2011 United Kingdom Takeover Code 
amendments because The Code Committee never questioned the 
importance of the Board Neutrality Rule,158 which should continue to 
prevent the possibility of board entrenchment. 
                                                 
153 See Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 113, 115 (2007). 
154 John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 97 
GEO. L. J. 1727, 1732 (2007).  
155 See Frakes, supra note 153, at 114-15. 
156 Board entrenchment refers to the phenomenon of a corporation’s 
board of directors taking possibly self-serving action to maintain their positions as 
directors of the company.  In the United States, when a board appears to be 
entrenching itself against shareholders’ wishes, a breach of fiduciary duty question 
will likely arise.  See generally Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 
Ch. 1988). 
157 See generally Frakes, supra note 153, at 114-15; Lucian A. Bebchuk, et 
al., The Powerful Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered Boards, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).  
158 See generally Consultation Paper, supra note 4 (declaring The Committee’s 
intention to make changes to The Code but never entertaining an amendment to 
the Board Neutrality Rule).  But see Patrone, supra note 5 (arguing that repealing the 
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The Board Neutrality Rule in the United Kingdom prevents 
much data about board entrenchment in the United Kingdom’s 
companies from being accumulated.159  However, exploring the 
effects of board entrenchment in United States companies resonates 
with The Code Committee’s support of the Board Neutrality Rule 
because the negative correlation of board entrenchment to 
shareholder value supports The Committee’s decision to continually 
maintain board neutrality.160  In 2002, Professor Bebchuk  and 
colleagues conducted an in-depth study of Delaware companies with 
both poison pills and staggered boards161 that showed that the 
combination of these defensive measures makes it almost impossible 
for a bidding company to acquire a target company without consent 
from the board of the target company.162 
The empirical evidence from Professor Bebchuk’s study 
suggests that staggered boards, combined with a poison pill, provide 
the most robust takeover defense in Delaware corporate law.163  
Furthermore, the research and statistical analysis shows that this 
robust takeover defense164 does, in fact, lead to board 
                                                 
Board Neutrality Rule would better protect target shareholders instead of 
protecting target companies). 
159 See Nicholas F. Carline & Pradeep K. Yadav, Decoupling the Motives for 
Takeover Resistance, and the Implications for Stockholders, Managers and Bidders 3-4 (August 
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The University of Oklahoma), 
http://www.ou.edu/content/dam/price/Finance/CFS/paper/pdf/SeminarPaper_
Carline.pdf.  
160 See Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 937.  
161 A staggered board of directors is a board that is split up into classes, 
and only one class is up for election at each annual shareholders meeting.  For 
example, a company with a nine-director staggered board, in three classes, would 
have only three directors up for election every year, with the winners of that 
election serving three-year terms before they would be up for another election.  
The staggered board thus prevents a change in control of a company’s shares from 
changing control of the board of directors until at least two annual shareholder 
meetings have passed, or in other words, at a minimum when just over one year has 
elapsed.  See Staggered Board, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 5, 2011, 12:35 PM),  
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/staggered-board.asp#axzz1iYTZNDa8.  
162 See Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 890. 
163 Id. at 950.  
164 In Delaware Corporate law the board of directors can unilaterally 
impose a poison pill if they can meet the Unocal enhanced business judgment test ex 
post in the Delaware courts.  See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
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entrenchment.165  It also shows that board entrenchment negatively 
affects shareholder value by an average of about 11.6% on their final 
return on investment.166  This loss of wealth to the shareholders is 
most likely due to the high odds that the target company will remain 
independent.167  Shareholders will often be unable to dismantle a 
staggered board or force the board to redeem a poison pill.168  The 
shareholders are financially harmed by the resulting board 
entrenchment and their inability to cash in on an acquisition 
premium offered by the acquiring company for their shares.169  This 
is the exact type of effect that the Takeover Panel sought to avoid in 
the United Kingdom with the Board Neutrality Rule. 
Michael D. Frakes, a disciple of Bebchuk’s, further explored 
how staggered boards affect firm value using three different statistical 
analyses designed to correct for estimated co-variables.170  He also 
found a negative correlation between staggered boards and 
                                                 
946, 955 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 
1985). 
165 Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 913-14, 937 (providing an example of U.S. 
Surgical’s hostile bid for Circon in 1996, where Circon was able to thwart U.S. 
Surgical’s hostile takeover attempt with a poison pill and an effective staggered 
board, only to end up selling itself two years later for 17% less than the original 
bid). 
166 Id.  (“As a starting point we examine total shareholder returns, 
irrespective of bid outcome, for [Effective Staggered Board (ESB)] and non-ESB 
targets.  Shareholders in the ESB targets in our sample achieved 31.8% returns in 
the nine months after a hostile bid was announced, compared to 43.4% returns for 
the shareholders in non-ESB targets, representing an 11.6% difference.”). 
167 Id. at 950 (“We find that the increased odds of remaining independent 
are quite costly for target shareholders, without providing sufficient countervailing 
benefits in terms of higher acquisition premium.  We estimate than an ESB reduces 
the expected return of target shareholders in the nine months after a hostile bid is 
launched on the order of 8-10%.  The negative wealth effect associated with ESBs 
is particularly problematic from a policy perspective because the majority of 
staggered boards were established before the judicial developments that gave them 
their antitakeover potency.”). 
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 See generally Frakes, supra note 153 (Frakes creates in-depth statistical 
models and regression analyses to correct for variables and co-variables such as 
other anti-takeover measures, firm size, firm value among others).   
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shareholder value.171 The Frakes and Bebchuk studies suggest that 
there could be added costs to target shareholders from how board 
entrenchment may affect manager and director behavior, though the 
studies specifically did not explore this aspect of staggered boards.172  
This suggestion, although still not conclusively proven, provides a 
supplemental argument to the aforementioned return on investment 
concerns when a board of directors is allowed to unilaterally enact 
entrenching defensive measures. 
As previously stated, these studies are not conclusive and 
there are arguments that defensive measures actually increase 
shareholder value.173  However, the argument that defensive measures 
provide the board of directors a negotiating advantage to achieve 
higher premiums for the shareholders in a hostile or friendly 
takeover174 has largely been undermined by Harvard Professor of 
Law and Business Guhan Subramanian.175  His research suggests that 
the bargaining power hypothesis is only applicable in a narrow subset 
of acquisitions.176  Professor Subramanian argues that takeover 
                                                 
171 See Id. at 150-51 (meaning that the more robust the defensive 
mechanism employed by the board of director, the lower shareholder value would 
tend to be).   
172 See Frakes, supra note 153, at 114, 150; Bebchuk, supra note 157, at 939 
(suggesting that when managers and directors are protected by defensive measures, 
they may not act as efficiently as possible, or in the best interest of the 
shareholders, because the directors know they cannot be ousted by discontent 
shareholders). 
173 See Frakes, supra note 153 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against 
Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U CHI. L. REV. 973, 1011 (2002) (explaining 
that some of the major arguments in favor of defensive measures by the board of 
directors are: defensive measures allow management to avoid distractions and focus 
on current operations; without defensive measures directors may focus excessively 
on short-term results to the detriment of long-term value; and most importantly, 
that defensive measures give management a bargaining power that allows them to 
maximize the premium paid to shareholders in a hostile takeover)). 
174 See generally Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover 
Defenses, 113 YALE L. J. 621, 629-30 (2003).  
175 See Subramanian, supra note 174, at 623. 
176 . Id. (“I demonstrate that the bargaining power hypothesis only applies 
unambiguously to negotiations in which there is a bilateral monopoly between 
buyer and seller, no incremental costs to making a hostile bid, symmetric 
information, and loyal sell-side agents.  These conditions suggest that the 
bargaining power hypothesis is only true in a subset of all deals, contrary to the 
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defenses do not help a target company’s shareholders nearly to the 
extent argued by the “bargaining power” proponents of defensive 
measures, even in friendly, negotiated acquisitions.177 
Although not dispositive, the above-mentioned legal 
economists provide strong evidence that supports promoting the 
neutrality of a target board of directors in a hostile takeover situation.  
There remains, however, the problem The Code Committee faced on 
how to address “short-term” investors in a takeover, while still 
requiring the target board of directors to remain neutral. 
 B.  Studies of the Effects of “Short-term” Investors 
Modern financial market practices can lead to a distortion of 
shareholder voting rights by decoupling those voting rights from an 
economic interest in the company.178  This often happens through the 
buying and selling of call options or put options on shares borrowed 
from brokers, or using other forms of derivatives.179  In mergers and 
acquisitions, voting disparity will arise in merger arbitrage,180 or 
                                                 
claim of some defense proponents that the hypothesis applies to all negotiated 
acquisitions.”).  
177 Id. at 684.  
178 See TR Investors, LLC v. Genger, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 153, 70-71 
(Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (explaining how the voting rights and residual claims of 
shares can be separated and thereby result in situations where a stock holder might 
vote adversely to the interests of the company because their economic interests do 
not align with shareholders who have a long-term, residual claim vested in their 
shares) (citing Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV.775).  
179 For discussions on the intricacies of methods of decoupling share 
voting rights from share economic interests see Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, 
Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775. See also Henry T. C. Hu and Bernard 
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006). 
180 Merger arbitrage is when an investor buys shares of the target 
company after the announcement of a merger or tender offer.  The investor hopes 
to profit on the premium paid by the acquirer to the target shareholders over the 
market price that the investor bought the shares after the announcement.  The 
major risk for this type of investment is if the companies fail to consummate the 
transaction, the shares will likely be worth less than what the investor paid to 
acquire them.  See Merger Arbitrage, FUNDAMENTALFINANCE (Jan. 16, 2012, 5:49 
PM),  
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alternatively, when a shareholder has a negative economic interest181 
arising when the investor short sells her shares.182 
In the modern M&A marketplace, the most influential short-
term investors are typically hedge or mutual funds.183  Institutional 
investors like mutual funds are, in practice, the only investors with 
the resources to attain voting rights sufficient to affect the outcome 
of a shareholder vote.184  There are recent examples of hedge funds 
being able to use their voting power to block or alter acquisitions 
from both the acquiring side and the target side.185  This institutional 
investor activism is not always detrimental to the established 
individual shareholders of these companies.186  However, the possible 
decoupling of the economic interests from the voting rights in a 
merger arbitrage situation poses serious complications with respect to 
the established shareholders.187  This section will attempt to 
                                                 
http://www.fundamentalfinance.com/mergers-acquisitions/merger-arbitrage.php.   
181 An investor might have a negative economic interest in a company 
when he or she makes a profit if the share price declines.  See Hu & Black, supra 
note 179, at 832-34. 
182 Short selling is when an investor borrows shares from their broker, 
and sells those shares immediately.  The investor is then required to “cover” those 
borrowed shares by buying identical securities and giving them back to the broker.  
The investor is attempting to profit by betting that the share price will fall between 
when they sell the borrowed shares and when they have to “cover” those shares.  A 
price drop will give the investor a profit of the difference in price of the initially 
sold shares and the bought back “covering” shares.  If the price rises within that 
time frame, however, the investor will realize a loss equal to that same difference.  
See Brigitte Yuille, Short Selling: What is Short Selling?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 16, 
2012, 6:14 PM),  
http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling/shortselling1.asp#axzz1jf8S
8DOx.  
183 See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 
59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1442 (2008).  
184 See supra note 148.  
185 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1034-36 (2007) 
(explaining, how Deutsche Borse was forced to abandon its bid for the London 
Stock Exchange because of its own dissatisfied hedge fund and mutual fund 
shareholders).   
186 Id. (explaining how Chiron institutional shareholders expressed 
dissatisfaction with Novartis’ bid for Chiron and eventually forced Novartis’ 
premium paid up from 23% to 32%).   
187 See infra Part III.B.1-2.  
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summarize the major concerns regarding the disconnect between 
voting rights and economic interests that have arisen over the last 
two decades and how those concerns pertain to mergers and tender 
offers.  The following sections will discuss a typical merger arbitrage 
situation, and the decoupling of votes and economic interests. 
1. Merger Arbitrage Situations 
It does not take a large inferential leap to realize that there 
can be situations where merger arbitrageurs may be able to obtain the 
votes to approve the sale of a target company, or to tender enough 
target company shares, to force a transaction that may not maximize 
value for established individual shareholders.188  A working paper by 
Georgetown finance professor Lee Pinkowitz used statistical analysis 
to highlight that companies with a large aggregate institutional 
shareholder block are more likely to be targets of takeovers, and that 
those takeovers are more likely to be successful.189  Pinkowitz’s 
analysis revealed that institutional investors are important to the 
takeover process because they either quickly tender their shares to the 
bidder, or quickly sell their shares on the open market to merger 
arbitrageurs.190  The study posits that the potential of these quick 
sales make the target stock more liquid, and thus more likely to make 
the acquisition successful.191 
  Likewise, Chancellor Chandler of the Delaware Chancery 
Court recently noted in the Air Products case that the threat of merger 
arbitrageurs tendering into an inadequate offer could be a legitimate 
threat under the first prong of a Unocal test,192 “if the offer is indeed 
                                                 
188 For a prime example see Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 
A.3d 48, 109 (Del. Ch. 2011) (explaining that merger arbitrageurs tendering into an 
inadequate offer may be a reasonable threat to a corporation). 
189 Lee F. Pinkowitz, Monitoring by Transient Investors?  Institutions and 
Corporate Control 21, 24 (unpublished manuscript) (on file at with Georgetown 
University, McDonough School of Business), 
http://faculty.msb.edu/lfp/Inst101800.pdf.   
190 Id. at 24.  
191 Id. at 28.  
192 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 955 (Del. 
1985) (stating that for board defensive measures to fall under the protection of the 
business judgment rule that the board must: 1) demonstrate that they had 
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness 
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inadequate.”193  In this case, by the time the suit was filed, almost half 
of the target company shareholders were merger arbitrageurs,194 
which may demonstrate the prevalence and potential impact of 
arbitrageurs on takeovers.  While Air Products concedes that merger 
arbitrageurs help complete acquisitive transactions, Chancellor 
Chandler strongly derides the possible adverse impact of merger 
arbitrageurs on target company shareholders in a takeover.195  As 
Chancellor Chandler explained in one case: 
[T]he bad [arbitrageurs] and hedge funds who bought 
in, had obviously bought their shares from folks who 
were glad to take the profits that came with market 
prices generated by the Merger and Vector Capital’s 
hint of a higher price. These folks, one can surmise, 
had satisfied whatever long-term objective they had 
for their investment in Inter-Tel.196 
Merger arbitrageurs clearly have an impact on M&A 
transactions in general, but there remains skepticism as to how much 
arbitrageurs negatively affect shareholders of the target company.  
Individual established shareholders still must choose to sell their 
shares to the “short-term” investors in the first place, thereby 
satisfying their own investing goals. 
                                                 
existed and 2) that their defensive measure in response was reasonable in 
comparison to the threat posed). 
193 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A. 3d 48, 109 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (explaining, however, that in this case there was no legitimate threat because 
the offer was, in fact, adequate). 
194 Id.  (“The argument is premised on the fact that a large percentage 
(almost half) of Airgas’s stockholders are merger arbitrageurs—many of whom 
bought into the stock when Air Products first announced its interest in acquiring 
Airgas, at a time when the stock was trading much lower than it is today—who 
would be willing to tender into an inadequate offer because they stand to make a 
significant return on their investment even if the offer grossly undervalues Airgas in 
a sale.”  In short, the risk is that a majority of Airgas’s stockholders will tender into 
Air Products’ offer despite its inadequate price tag, leaving the minority “coerced” 
into taking $70 as well). 
195 Id.  (“The defendants do not appear to have come to grips with the 
fact that the arbs bought their shares from long-term stockholders who viewed the 
increased market price generated by Air Products’ offer as a good time to sell”).   
196 Id. at 109 n. 413 (citing Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 
786, 815 (Del. Ch. 2007)).   
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   2. Problems with Decoupling Voting Rights and Economic Interests 
 
  Further compounding this institutional investor complex is 
how derivatives197 can decouple the economic interest from the 
voting rights of shares.  Two examples can help to illustrate this 
principle.  First, imagine a proposed acquisition where a target 
company institutional shareholder is strongly interested in 
consummating a proposed stock for stock merger, only the 
investment community and influential acquiring company 
shareholders think it is a bad deal and begin to convince the acquiring 
company to back away.  The institutional shareholder then buys 
almost 9.9% of the acquiring company stock, but immediately short 
sells198 another 9.9%.  This transaction gives the institutional 
shareholder the 9.9% vote from the first stock purchase, but 
completely removes any economic risk from that purchase because 
the short sale will totally offset any gain or loss from the voting stock.  
Therefore, the institutional shareholder has a block of shares to vote 
for the transaction against the wishes of most of the acquiring 
company shareholders, at no economic risk, and then benefits greatly 
from its target company stock after it is sold at an acquisition 
premium, to the acquiring company.199 
  A second example occurred in Hong Kong in early 2006 
where a deal, of which most minority target shareholders approved, 
was blocked by a hedge fund.200  The fund had borrowed target 
                                                 
197 Examples include, futures contracts, forward contracts, options and 
swaps.  See Derivative, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 18, 2011, 1:35 PM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/derivative.asp#axzz1jqBsyPgK.  
198 See supra note 182  
199 This entire example is heavily based on the Mylan Laboratories offer 
for King Pharmaceuticals, where Perry Hedge Fund acted much like the example 
institutional investor.  For an excellent review of this situation see Anish Monga, 
Note, Using Derivatives to Manipulate the Market for Corporate Control, 12 STAN. J. L. 
BUS. & FIN. 186, 196-97 (2006).  
200 See Hu & Black, supra note 179, at 834-35 (“Henderson Land offered 
to buy the 25% minority interest in Henderson Investment, a publicly held affiliate. 
Most minority shareholders favored the buyout, and Henderson Investment’s share 
price increased substantially. Under Hong Kong law, however, the buyout could be 
blocked by a negative vote of 10% of the “free floating” shares—in this case about 
2.5% of the outstanding shares. To everybody’s surprise, 2.7% of the shares were 
voted against the buyout. Henderson Investments shares fell 17% the day after the 
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company shares, and short sold them to make a profit off of the 
collapsed deal when the target share price declined sharply after the 
deal fell through.201  Other economic and voting decoupling 
complications can arise in various contexts, including other merger 
and acquisition situations.202  While many of the risks and pitfalls that 
are pervasive throughout merger arbitrage stand out and beg to be 
addressed by different takeover regimes, it remains unclear if target 
company shareholders suffer due to these merger arbitrageurs.  To 
summarize, the Board Neutrality Rule appears to well protect 
shareholders, while it remains far from conclusive that “short-term” 
investors do, or do not have a negative impact on shareholders. 
IV.  WHY THE TAKEOVER CODE AMENDMENTS WILL WORK 
The Code Committee may have gotten the 2011 Takeover 
Code amendments just right.  The staggering number of variables in 
any regulation means that only time will tell if The Committee did, in 
fact, hit a bull’s eye with these amendments, or if corrective changes 
will be necessary sooner rather than later.  This section will 
hypothesize that the amendments will accomplish the goal of leveling 
the playing field between targets and acquirers, all while continuing to 
robustly protect shareholders, and not overreaching to the detriment 
of other members of the M&A marketplace. 
The Code Committee and the Takeover Panel set out to fix 
the perceived imbalance of power in favor of acquiring companies 
over target companies, and more importantly, the perceived adverse 
effect of “short-term” investors.203  The amendments should help to 
rectify this imbalance in a number of ways.  First, the mandatory “Put 
                                                 
voting outcome was announced. It appears that . . . hedge funds borrowed 
Henderson Investment shares before the record date, voted against the buyout, and 
then sold those shares short, thus profiting from its private knowledge that the 
buyout would be defeated”).  
201 Id.  
202 See generally Martin & Partnoy, supra note 179, at 788-92.  
203 See supra Part I. 
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Up or Shut Up” deadline should combat the “virtual bid” issues with 
hostile takeovers in the United Kingdom.204 
The mandatory “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline gives only a 
limited window of four weeks for a potential bidder to make a firm 
offer or walk away for six months.205  The amount of pressure to 
blindly sell the target company applied to a company by merger 
arbitrageurs should be partially alleviated by the limited window 
imposed by this deadline.206  If a company can no longer besiege a 
target,207 then this will decrease the likelihood that the composition of 
the shareholders will have changed significantly through arbitrageurs 
buying from established shareholders at small price increases.208  
Smaller voting blocks of merger arbitrageurs means that there would 
likely be more established target shareholders available to vote on the 
merits of the offer as they see fit.  Unlike in Air Products, where by the 
time the suit was filed almost half of the shareholders were 
arbitrageurs, the limited window and the Announcing All Bidders 
requirement should prevent large scale arbitrage from taking place in 
the takeover of United Kingdom public companies and should 
protect the established shareholders of the target companies in the 
original spirit of The Code.209  Although The Code forbids coercive 
offers,210 the besieging of a target company was in a way coercive by 
allowing arbitrageurs to erode target shareholder support.  The “Put 
Up or Shut Up” deadline should make great strides in rectifying the 
erosion that results from the uncertainty of a protracted “virtual bid” 
period; and the added secrecy and cost that may be placed on 
                                                 
204 See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.  
205 See supra Part I.A-B.  
206 These merger arbitrageurs will have likely bought target stock on the 
open market after a slight increase in price due to the looming potential offer.  
From that stock they would use their voting power to attempt to consummate the 
transaction, and realize a gain on the acquisition premium paid by the acquirer.   
207 Under the pre-amendment rules a company could besiege a target by 
announcing that it is thinking about making a bid, while never actually making a bid 
for months on end. 
208 See supra note 195; see also supra text accompanying note 25.  
209 See supra note 12.  
210 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 9.1 at F1-F13 (requiring a bid to 
all target shareholders if a bid is made for over 30% control, and requiring a best 
offer, that the best offer made to any shareholder is made to all shareholders). 
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acquiring companies is worth the benefits to the target 
shareholders.211 
The deal protection ban will likely have a small impact in 
protecting shareholders, but to what extent remains to be seen.  The 
possibility exists that the inducement fee ban will actually decrease 
the amount of acquiring companies that want to make an offer 
because they will fear spending money on the preparation only to 
lose out to a topping bidder.212  That may help the target company,213 
but it may hurt the target company shareholders.214  However The 
Code Committee left itself an out by requiring a review of the 
amendments in September 2012.215 The Committee’s one year review 
returned positive reviews of the amendments.216 The Committee 
admitted that it was difficult to assess if any potential offerors have 
been deterred by the amendments, however it does state that overall 
bid activity remained at a similar level the year after the amendments 
were enacted.217 The Committee also noted that the year after the 
amendments saw none of the major concerns of the critics of the 
amendments come to fruition.218  The general consensus of The 
Committee was that in the first year, the Amendments successfully 
curbed the problems of the “virtual bid” while not overly burdening 
bidding companies.219 
                                                 
211 See supra Part II.B.  
212 See supra Part II.B.  
213 It may help the target company to remain independent, and therefore 
the target company board to keep their jobs, because the target will not receive any 
bids at all.  Or, it could help the target by allowing it to court a white knight 
topping bid with a company that the board prefers, even if that company will not 
offer a maximum bid. 
214 It can hurt the shareholders, as Professor Bebchuk’s study showed, by 
diminishing the return to the shareholders because the target company remains 
independent.  See supra note 167. 
215 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 5. 
216 See generally One Year Review, supra note 99. 
217 One Year Review, supra note 99, at 5.  
218 For example, the Review noted that no instances of more well-
prepared bidders “flushing out” less-prepared bidders were realized. Id. at 5-6.  The 
Review also stated that there was a significant reduction in an “offer period” being 
commenced due to an untoward movement in share prices instead of because of a 
firm offer. Id. at 6.   
219 See One Year Review, supra note 99, at 5-10. 
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As The Committee said in its Response Statement, 
inducement fees as they were used in practice before the 
amendments may just as well have hurt the target shareholders by 
precluding any topping bids by competing bidders.220  The 
Committee states in their One Year Review that they generally 
consider the ban on deal protection measures a success.221 By not 
making any earth shattering changes to the deal protections used in 
the United Kingdom,222 and by allowing room to change any 
detrimental effects of this ban, The Code Committee has provided a 
very balanced approach to attempting to protect target shareholders 
through the deal protection ban. 
The enhanced disclosure requirements should substantially 
help to provide target company shareholders with more crucial 
information about the acquiring company’s financial outlook, its 
intentions, and its stakeholders.  The acquiring company will also 
benefit from enhanced disclosures from the target company.223  
These enhanced disclosures were strongly supported in the Response 
Statement,224 and for good reason.  Enhanced disclosure and better 
information improves decision-making.  Furthermore, The 
Committee reviewed the disclosure requirements in their one year 
review and found that they improved transparency in offers.225 
An easy argument for an American commentator to make 
regarding the initial perceived imbalance favoring acquirers would be 
to simply advocate for a target company’s board to be able to use 
defensive measures like in Delaware.226  However, economic studies 
show a trend that those very defensive measures can lead to 
                                                 
220 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 39.  
221 One Year Review, supra note 99, at 10-13. The Committee also noted, 
though, that some bidders and targets still included some agreements that the 
Committee Executive considered in violation of the amendments. Id. at 11.  
222 Banning the deal protection measures is still only a decrease of 1% in 
the size of the inducement fees.  See supra text accompanying note 113. 
223 See supra Part II.D.  
224 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 68, 80.  
225 One Year Review, supra note 99, at 15-17. 
226 See Patrone, supra note 5 at 85.  
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significantly lower returns to the target shareholders.227  In light of 
these studies by prominent economists, it is hard to imagine that 
repealing the Board Neutrality Rule would not lead to occasional 
situations that harm shareholder investments significantly.  The 
Takeover Panel should be applauded for remaining so steadfastly in 
support of the Board Neutrality Rule as it embodies the shareholder 
protection that is one of the main goals of The Code.228  Target 
shareholders can rest assured that the board of directors will typically 
be serving the shareholders’ best interest and not their own.  The 
target shareholders also should assume that they will get close to the 
maximum merited premium on their shares, and thus the best return 
on investment they could possibly receive in a given takeover 
scenario. 
The economic studies generally support keeping the target 
board of directors neutral in a hostile takeover.  But, The Code 
Committee had to address the merger arbitrageurs and their influence 
on bids in a measured fashion.229  The Committee achieved this in 
intelligent fashion by enacting the deadline rules and ultimately 
rejecting a proposal for more stringent regulation of “short-term” 
investors.230  The Committee originally proposed, but later rejected, a 
rule that would bar all investors who acquired shares in the target 
after an announcement started a waiting period, from voting on the 
merger or from tendering their shares.231 
This proposal would have been too draconian of an approach 
to regulating “short-term” investors.  Law professors who have 
written about the problems of decoupled voting rights and economic 
interests in shares232 never mention an instance where merger 
arbitrageurs bought target company shares only to severely harm the 
                                                 
227 See supra Part III.A (an average of 11.6% lower returns for 
shareholders whose boards of directors were using entrenching defensive 
mechanisms).  
228 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 2(a) at A1.  
229 See Response Statement, supra note 89, at 5.  
230 Consultation Paper, supra note 4, at 20.  
231 Id.  
232 See generally Martin & Partnoy, supra note 179; Hu & Black supra note 
179.  
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target company through tendering into a totally inadequate offer.233  
Like Chancellor Chandler noted in Air Products, arbitrageurs have to 
buy their shares from long-term investors who must have felt content 
with the return on their investment.234  To take away that option 
would harm some target company long-term shareholders in 
contravention of the principles of The Code. 
If The Code Committee were to limit the voting rights for 
“short-term” investors, there would likely be a noticeable decrease in 
arbitrage activity.  This would mean fewer opportunities for 
established shareholders to sell their stock at the slight price increase 
that will result from the potential offer.235  Stripping some 
shareholders of the ability to gain from their investment to protect all 
of the shareholders does not align itself with The Code principles,236 
and The Code Committee made the right decision by ultimately 
rejecting this proposal. 
The Panel should not foreclose the proposed amendment to 
disenfranchise “short-term” investors in its entirety.  If, and only if, 
during its mandatory annual review of the 2011 amendments, The 
Panel decides that the amendments are not adequately correcting the 
imbalance of power in favor of bidders, The Panel should consider 
enacting this amendment on a limited basis.  Instead of eliminating the 
voting or acceptance rights of all investors who purchase target 
company stock after the announcement of a potential bid, The Panel 
should consider halving those “short-term” investors’ vote.  This 
could allow for more voting power to remain with established 
shareholders, without reducing the value of the shares purchased 
after the announcement of a potential offer to the same extent those 
                                                 
233 See supra Part III.B.2. 
234 See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 109 n. 413 
(citing Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 815 (Del. Ch. 2007)).  
235 For example, if Company A’s stock is trading at $20 per share, and 
Company B offers to buy all of the stock of Company A at $30 per share, there will 
be an immediate price increase upwards towards that $30 mark.  It will not reach 
$30 because there is the risk that the transaction will not happen, but the price 
increase does provide an immediate opportunity to profit from an investment by 
selling to a merger arbitrageur. 
236 See Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, Gen. Principles 1-6; 
Takeover Code, supra note 3, Introduction, ¶ 2(a) at A1. 
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shares would be devalued under a scheme of total 
disenfranchisement. 
This potential variation on the proposed amendment could 
be further narrowed in scope by tying it to the Rule 8.3 disclosure 
requirements.237  Rule 8.3 requires that any person who is or becomes 
interested in 1% or more of the securities of any party to a 
transaction, either before the announcement or during the offer 
period, must disclose to the public their interest in any securities 
relevant to the transaction as well as the details of any short positions 
in any relevant securities to the transaction.238  If only those “short-
term” investors who have both over 1% interest and short positions 
in opposing, relevant securities were to have their voting power 
halved, then many of the problems associated with decoupling 
economic interest and voting rights could be improved without 
overly burdening established shareholders who want to sell their 
shares to “short-term” investors.  In other words, Rule 8.3 will make 
it known which shareholders hold significant interests on both sides 
of the transaction, and furthermore which have short positions which 
decouple their economic interests and voting interests.  Investors in 
these situations will almost always be arbitrageurs.  By halving the 
vote of those arbitrageurs with significant voting power, established 
shareholders will retain more power over the decision to accept the 
bid, but this will not entirely preclude those long-term investors who 
want to sell to arbitrageurs from doing so.  This could result in a 
“best of both worlds” situation that optimizes both established 
shareholder protections and the liquidity of a company’s stock. 
The Panel would have to undertake a consultation period and 
another study to determine the feasibility of such a narrowly tailored 
disenfranchisement amendment.  It may not be possible to keep track 
of, or distinguish, all of the shareholders who may be affected by this 
variation of the proposed amendment, and so this proposed 
amendment variation may ultimately be deemed impossible to 
implement.  However, The Panel should leave itself the option of 
                                                 
237 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 8.3 at E21.  
238 Takeover Code, supra note 3, Rule 8.3(a)-(b) at E21; Takeover Code, supra 
note 3, Rule 8, note 5(a)(ii) at E27.  
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exploring this possible amendment if the current amendments fail to 
live up to their goals. 
In sum, the United Kingdom’s 2011 Takeover Code 
amendments were almost spot-on in their repairs of target 
shareholder protections in hostile takeovers.  The one year review has 
returned positive results.  The review supports the amendments and 
conclude, that at least within the first year, the amendments have 
protected target shareholders but not overreached to the point of 
chilling the M&A market. The amendments as they were enacted will 
continue protect target companies and target shareholders who are 
under siege from a hostile bidder.  The amendments will increase 
shareholder access to information and allow them to choose the best 
offer presented to them, or reject all offers, without being bear-
hugged into submission during the “virtual bid” period.  A potential 
incremental increase in shareholder protection may be able to be 
achieved by exploring the possibility of limiting, but not totally 
excluding, the voting rights of the few “short-term” investors who 
also have short positions in a security relevant to the transaction.  
Moreover, The Code Committee’s commitment to the Board 
Neutrality Rule appears to be the strongest protection for established 
target company shareholders that the Takeover Code can provide.239  
Lastly, The Code Committee was smart in not committing to an 
almost draconian measure that likely would have harmed target 
shareholders as much or more than it would have protected them.  
The measured response from The Panel may be remembered as a 
great stride forward in modern M&A practice.  Only time will tell. 
CONCLUSION 
The Kraft takeover of Cadbury flared tempers around the 
United Kingdom.  Although The Panel operated quickly, and in what 
could have been viewed as a reactionary manner, its response to the 
Kraft-Cadbury takeover will likely be remembered as a strong 
improvement in the United Kingdom’s takeover regulation.  The 
Announcing All Bidders requirement and the mandatory twenty-eight 
day “Put Up or Shut Up” deadline should do an excellent job of 
addressing the pre-amendment problems with the “virtual bid.”  The 
                                                 
239 See generally Part III.A.  
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inducement fee ban could allow target company shareholders more 
flexibility and freedom to entertain opposing or topping bids.  The 
enhanced disclosure requirements will increase information and aide 
in the decision making of the shareholders as well as the companies 
involved in a transaction.  These amendments are designed to tilt the 
balances of power back to a more equivalent position between 
acquiring companies and target companies in hostile takeovers.  
Furthermore, The Code Committee did not overreach when it 
adopted these amendments and thus the amendments will not act as 
too burdensome of a detriment to the mergers and acquisitions 
market.  Therefore, the 2011 Takeover Code amendments will likely 
be successful in achieving their goals and protecting target 
shareholders to an optimal extent. 
 
